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 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SO-
CIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL AC-
COUNTING 
 
The proportion of large multinational 
companies reporting on the social and 
environmental consequences of their 
business activities has dramatically in-
creased during the last decade.  In 1998, 
35% of the Fortune Global 250 pub-
lished social and environmental reports.  
This proportion has increased to 45% 
three years later and 64% in 2006 (Kolk, 
2003; 2008; KPMG, 2002).   European 
companies are more likely to disclose 
social and environmental data than U.S. 
companies and are generally seen as 
“best practice” trendsetters in social and 
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environmental accounting (SEA) (Owen 
& O'Dwyer, 2008; Standard & Poor's, 
SustainAbility & UNEP, 2004).  None-
theless, some scholars have raised con-
cerns about “greenwashing,” the lack of 
verification or verifiability, and thus the 
lack of genuine accountability (Owen & 
O'Dwyer, 2008).  As SEA touches on 
most dimensions of organizational per-
formance and social efficiency as de-
fined below, this commentary contextu-
alizes SEA by focusing on the integral 
elements of effective SEA and its politi-
cal governance contingencies.    
 
For the purpose of this paper, we define 
SEA as the provision of information 
about business impact and performance 
with regard to social and environmental 
issues.  Like standard financial account-
ing, SEA measures, monitors, and con-
trols business activities and thus is help-
ful to both internal (e.g., managers) and 
external (e.g., investors) stakeholders. In 
line with this functional definition, effec-
tiveness of SEA is defined as the extent 
to which SEA meets two equally impor-
tant objectives, namely: the non-
financial information requirements of 
organizational stakeholders in verifiable 
form and the contribution of SEA to 
business as a performance-enhancing 
tool (Epstein, 2008).  Thus, to analyze 
the effectiveness of SEA requires a 
deeper understanding of outcomes at the 
societal and organizational levels of 
analysis.    
 
At the societal level, that level of SEA is 
most effective that achieves greatest so-
cial efficiency, that is, maximum aggre-
gate societal well-being (with both bene-
fits and costs of SEA to all constituents 
being included in this utilitarian calcu-
lus) (Baron, 2006).  At the organiza-
tional level, effectiveness is captured by 
the level of SEA that maximizes the firm
-specific utility of SEA (again consider-
ing both costs and benefits of SEA, but 
only costs and benefits for the reporting 
organization).  Keeping levels of analy-
sis distinct is important because the two 
different objectives of effectiveness may 
not necessarily converge with respect to 
conclusions about the “right” level or 
type of SEA as they consider different 
costs and benefits at different levels of 
analysis for different actors (as we will 
show in this paper).  The overall conclu-
sion of our argument is that, given lim-
ited resources, both organizations and 
society as a whole should—in the inter-
ests of outcome effectiveness—only pur-
sue those actions that maximize out-
comes at minimal cost.  Connecting 
SEA to organizational and societal net 
benefits, we introduce ideas that are pri-
marily prescriptive in nature.  According 
to Donaldson and Preston (1995) and 
Bazerman (2005), prescriptive theories 
connect actions A to outcomes B, i.e., 
evaluate the extent to which any action 
A is instrumental to achieve any out-
come B.  Although we do not provide a 
normative foundation for our chosen 
outcomes at organizational and societal 
level (there may be others), the sections 
on political governance systems, con-
ceived as important contextual forces, do 
nevertheless allude to some of the nor-
mative underpinnings of our chosen out-
comes.1 
      
Our contribution to this issue of Issues 
in Social and Environmental Accounting 
1 
 Prescriptive, or instrumental, theorizing differs from 
normative theory in that the latter identifies moral or 
philosophical guidelines for the operation and manage-
ment of business firms, while the former describes 
connections, or the lack thereof, between any action 
(e.g., SEA) and company objectives (e.g., profitability) 
or sociopolitical objectives (e.g., democracy) 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  
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is structured as follows.  First, we sum-
marize potential benefits and costs of 
SEA to reporting organizations and the 
organizations’ stakeholders. Second, in 
building off these general considera-
tions, we derive some suggestions for 
best practice in SEA.  Third, we present 
the current empirical evidence regarding 
the financial benefits of social and envi-
ronmental disclosures for the reporting 
organization.  Fourth, we point out how 
broader social and political governance 
systems may influence, constrain, or 
support SEA.  Finally, we conclude with 
some suggestions for fruitful future re-
search agendas in SEA. 
 
Benefits and costs of SEA based on 
economic theory 
 
Two seminal economic theories 
(signaling theory and transaction cost 
economics) can be used to analyze the 
costs and benefits of SEA.  From a 
managerial perspective, economic theo-
ries are useful because they make ex-
plicit what other theories applied to 
SEA, such as legitimacy theory 
(Deegan, 2002), leave implicit.  In other 
words, they make costs and benefits the 
central foci of the analysis of SEA.  As 
shown in Figure 1, it is argued that these 
benefits and costs accrue to the reporting 
organization and society at large.  
 
Benefits and costs to the reporting 
organization 
 
The conventional explanation for SEA, 
legitimacy theory (Deegan, 2002), relies 
on an institutional logic of conformity.  
According to legitimacy theory, organi-
zations conform to stakeholder expecta-
tions of “good” behavior and to a 
broader “social contract” (Mathews, 
1993).  The idea that organizations con-
tinually strive to gain or maintain legiti-
macy is consistent with the notion of 
isomorphism in institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  To the 
extent that stakeholders claim a right to 
know details about organizations’ social 
and environmental initiatives, organiza-
tions will try to live up to these expecta-
tions and, thus, close the legitimacy gap 
between stakeholder perceptions and 
organizational reality (Campbell, 2000).  
Seen in this light, SEA can be regarded 
as an explanation and justification of 
current organizational activities (Maurer, 
1971) or an effort to garner social sup-
port (Suchman, 1995).  In short, legiti-
macy theory can be considered an amal-
gam of institutional explanations and 
Shift in emphasis 
from laissez-faire 
  
to 
liberal democratic 
state 
  Benefits Costs 
To Reporting 
Organization 
• Legitimacy 
• Competitive advan-
tage (through sig-
naling/reputation) 
  
• Signaling costs 
(e.g., monitoring, 
data collection) 
To Other 
Stakeholders 
• Decreasing transac-
tion costs 
• Opportunity costs 
• Information over-
load/ambiguity 
  
Figure 1 
Taking Account of Social and Environmental Accounting 
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stakeholder theory (Campbell, 2000).  
Whilst legitimacy theory is of key im-
portance, research has suggested that 
other theories can help provide further 
and arguably more nuanced explanations 
for the prevalence of SEA activities. For 
example, Campbell (2000) showed that 
chairman succession affected the level 
of the voluntary disclosures of Marks 
and Spencer, a British retailer.  Camp-
bell argued that because different corpo-
rate leaders may perceive organizational 
environments differently, we cannot un-
derstand organizations’ investment in 
SEA technology without analyzing the 
cognitive filtering mechanisms inside 
managers’ heads.  Similarly, it is diffi-
cult for legitimacy theory to argue that 
business executives make resource allo-
cations without reference to some type 
of cost-benefit analysis.  This omission 
is redressed in this paper given its focus 
on economics and political governance, 
and its concern to offer practical solu-
tions to managerial questions about the 
“right” level of voluntary SEA. 
 
From an economic perspective, signal-
ing theory adds explanatory power.  
Market signaling captures an economic 
view of organizational reputation be-
cause a signal is used to communicate 
information to, or change the beliefs of, 
other actors in the market (Spence, 
1974; 2002).  Thus, a signaling device 
such as SEA represents a differentiating 
(rather than mimetic or homogenizing) 
characteristic through which the report-
ing company may gain competitive ad-
vantage.  In the same way as a degree of 
higher education may signal job appli-
cants’ intelligence, work motivation, or 
productivity, SEA can signal an organi-
zation’s commitment to corporate citi-
zenship.  In turn, this can affect the or-
ganization’s financial bottom line.  For 
example, “good” corporate citizens may 
attract more talented employees 
(Greening & Turban, 2000; Turban & 
Cable, 2003; Turban & Greening, 1996) 
and address environmental challenges 
and opportunities more proactively 
(Berry & Rondinelli, 1998; Hart, 1995; 
2007).  Insofar as SEA is not imposed 
on all businesses and instead is voluntar-
ily chosen, its adoption may lead to 
greater interorganizational trust and, in 
turn, higher economic performance and 
growth (Hosmer, 1995; Knack & 
Keefer, 1997).  The overarching as-
sumption in signaling theory is that man-
agers will be incentivized to maximize 
these reputational returns of SEA net of 
its associated signaling costs.  These 
signaling costs include financial and non
-financial (e.g., time) expenditures asso-
ciated with the collection and dissemina-
tion of SEA information.     
 
However, not all organizations can ex-
pect to derive the same benefits from 
SEA signaling. The effectiveness of sig-
naling depends on the extent to which 
stakeholders interpret SEA correctly as a 
signal of business responsibility and 
commercial reliability.  This implies that 
an activity or characteristic that is rela-
tively more costly for the lower-quality 
types in the market (i.e., irresponsible 
organizations) tends to be more effective 
as a signal because this makes it more 
expensive for irresponsible organiza-
tions to attain it and, thus, it is more 
likely to be used as a (valid) signal by 
responsible market actors.  Conversely, 
insofar as managers know what types of 
signals are used by stakeholders under 
conditions of information uncertainty, 
they may be tempted to “fake” signals, 
so that the signals do not validly sepa-
rate responsible and irresponsible or-
ganizations (Spence, 1974).  For exam-
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ple, many outsiders mistook Enron’s 
faking of social responsibility for genu-
ine corporate responsibility.  Likewise, 
many consumers seem to be misled by 
the marketing of “ethical food,” which 
may have a number of ecologically 
harmful side-effects (Economist, 2006).  
When this kind of dishonesty or over-
statement happens SEA’s value as a sig-
naling device will be weakened.  
 
 
Benefits and costs of SEA to stake-
holders 
 
Any economic transaction incurs trans-
action costs, and all organizational ac-
tors are motivated to minimize these 
transaction costs (Coase, 1937; William-
son, 1975; 1985).  Because of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1997) and opportun-
ism (Williamson, 1975), transaction 
costs are uncertain and often difficult to 
predict (Williamson, 1993).   As men-
tioned above, SEA may signal that the 
reporting organization is behaving in a 
caring and responsible manner and, thus, 
provide evidence (hard data) summariz-
ing, or at least illustrating, the organiza-
tion’s social and environmental activi-
ties. This will reduce transaction costs 
(borne by stakeholders): e.g. expenses 
associated with the monitoring and 
searching for signifiers of corporate re-
sponsibility and promise keeping.  
Stakeholders that claim a right to know 
about organizations’ social and environ-
mental activities would have to spend 
much more time searching for this infor-
mation if SEA data were unavailable.  
For example, stakeholders would have to 
interview competitors and suppliers or 
spend money on undercover data collec-
tion. In other words, because SEA can 
serve as a market signal, it may also 
lower transaction costs for stakeholders.  
Insofar as the signal can be invalid, the 
reduction of transaction costs is, of 
course, not an automatic outcome of 
SEA.   
 
Stakeholder costs as a consequence of 
SEA are more difficult to specify than 
the more obvious and tangible costs to 
the reporting organization.  Stakeholders 
primarily incur opportunity costs.  These 
opportunity costs arise from the fact that 
the reporting organization sacrifices 
some investments in stakeholder man-
agement activities that are not SEA. For 
example, instead of spending managerial 
time and organizational resources (such 
as paper) on the collection and compila-
tion of data in glossy reports, organiza-
tions could devote more time to interac-
tive stakeholder dialogues or address 
environmental risks. However, because 
SEA typically serves as a control device 
for past mistakes or failures in stake-
holder management (Epstein, 2008), 
these opportunity costs are likely to be 
quite low.  In addition to opportunity 
costs, accelerating provision of social 
and environmental reports may also lead 
to information overload and, therefore, 
more (rather than less) stakeholder un-
certainty about the meaning of all this 
information—particularly when SEA 
tends to be based on non-standardized 
measures, which might be incommensu-
rate in cross-firm and cross-industry 
comparisons.   
 
 
Best practice in SEA 
 
These instrumental theories of SEA can 
add important insights to previous “SEA 
best practice” lists, which included, for 
example, Zadek et al.’s (1997) criteria of 
inclusivity, comparability, completeness, 
external verification, and continuous 
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improvement. This and other best prac-
tice lists focus mainly on duty-based 
precepts.  Deontological principles can 
obviously be praised from a moral per-
spective. Nevertheless, they can some-
times be accused of providing limited 
levels of managerial or political guid-
ance regarding the practical limits im-
posed on SEA by resource scarcity and, 
thus, the “right” level of SEA. For ex-
ample, the imperfect Kantian duty to 
treat others beneficiently – which is a 
duty that can be related to the duty that 
corporate managers might be considered 
as having in regard to accurate reporting 
– provides limited guidance as to how 
one should help others, how many one 
should try to help, how much time one 
should devote to helping others, and so 
on (e.g., Korsgaard, 1996: 20-21; White, 
2004: 92-94).    
 
In contrast to many duty-based precepts, 
which are often limited in their capacity 
to provide practical advice regarding the 
allocation of resources, the aforemen-
tioned theories can be used to derive the 
following prescriptive advice for best 
practice in SEA (see Endnote 1 on the 
distinction between prescriptive and nor-
mative dimensions of an issue).  
 
First, at the organizational level of 
analysis, the preceding theories suggest 
that managers ought to initiate SEA so 
that the difference between total benefits 
of SEA for their firm and total SEA 
costs of their firm is maximized.  Ex-
pressed differently, SEA should expand 
up to the point where firm-specific mar-
ginal benefits from SEA equal marginal 
costs. Only the firm-specific benefits 
and costs of SEA are included in the 
formal calculus of MBSEA(firm) = MCSEA
(firm).    
 
Second, and from the broader societal 
perspective, the preceding theories sug-
gest that social efficiency—i.e., the dif-
ference between all societal benefits 
emerging from SEA and all societal 
costs emerging from SEA—should be 
maximized (see Baron, 2006 on social 
efficiency in general).  This implies the 
following change in the utilitarian calcu-
lus: MBSEA(all) = MCSEA(all).   
 
Undoubtedly, this cost-benefit analysis, 
whether at the organizational or societal 
level, is no easy task.  The specification 
of all benefits and costs associated with 
SEA is difficult.  However, our theoriz-
ing offers the following suggestions.  
First, SEA should be stakeholder-
oriented rather than focused on society 
at large (Clarkson, 1995; Orlitzky, 2007; 
Orlitzky & Swanson, in press): for the 
simple reason that costs and benefits can 
only ever be related to specific constitu-
ents.  What this means is that, stake-
holder-centered reasoning requires that 
those who will reap the benefits related 
to SEA, and those who will bear the 
costs, be concretely specified.  In con-
trast, reasoning based on some amor-
phous “common good” can be under-
stood to present an obstacle to estimat-
ing the concrete costs and benefits asso-
ciated with SEA.   
 
At the same time, a stakeholder focus in 
SEA reiterates the importance of con-
tinuous improvement with (ever-
changing) stakeholder needs in mind and 
as long as marginal benefits exceed mar-
ginal costs.  An issue focus, on the other 
hand, might reify “issues” as stable enti-
ties to be addressed when reality would 
recommend a mindset that acknowl-
edges stakeholder groups’ (or individu-
als’) evolving constructions of organiza-
tional reality.  For example, what at one 
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point in time was perceived as “business 
as usual” (e.g., disposal of oil rigs in the 
North Sea) might shift –almost over-
night—to a deeply moral issue that oil 
companies must address.  More broadly, 
flexibility allows for the innovations and 
strategic planning necessary to devise 
solutions in stakeholder and environ-
mental management that are cost-
effective and optimal for overall societal 
well-being (Husted & Salazar, 2006).  
Thus, reporting flexibility emerges as a 
key principle of effective SEA, a point 
to which we will return in the section on 
political governance systems.   
 
In effective SEA, there is not only cross-
temporal but also geographic flexibility.  
Stakeholders in different cultures may 
espouse different values (Donaldson, 
1989; Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999), and 
SEA should reflect different cultures’ 
differing preferences, norms, and priori-
ties.  This best practice of international 
flexibility even applies to “objective 
facts” such as pollution abatement or 
animal rights because different cultures 
espouse different views on the impor-
tance and substance of such practices.   
Our instrumental theory of SEA effec-
tiveness also explains why verifiability 
and verification of organizations’ social 
and environmental disclosures are so 
important.  Without verifiability and, in 
fact, actual credible verification, espe-
cially external stakeholders would ex-
perience no cost advantages when deal-
ing with “responsible” versus 
“irresponsible” organizations because 
those SEA signals could not be trusted.  
Sooner or later, markets will collapse 
when there is information asymmetry (as 
in the case of SEA) and low trust be-
tween buyers and sellers of products 
and/or information (Akerlof, 1970).  In 
this sense, market pressures exist for 
greater verifiability and accountability, 
and as shown by Akerlof and other 
economists, well-functioning markets 
tend not to reward the lack of transpar-
ency.      
 
 
Empirical evidence on the effective-
ness of SEA 
 
As is obvious by now, we do not assume 
that more and more SEA is necessarily 
the optimal outcome for an organization 
(or society at large); nor do we assume 
that any particular type of SEA is neces-
sarily optimal for either organizations or 
societies.  Instead, we make the more 
realistic assumption that SEA, though 
often resulting in many benefits, is never 
a cost-free exercise and reaches an opti-
mum level, beyond which net benefits 
(especially for business) will start to fall 
(see previous section on opportunity, 
signaling, transaction, and other costs).  
To understand the net effectiveness of 
SEA more fully, we can draw on empiri-
cal research to test this assumption—at 
least partially.  Specifically, we can 
draw on past empirical studies that have 
examined the question to what extent 
SEA is linearly correlated with corporate 
financial performance across industries 
and study contexts.  A large positive 
correlation would cast doubt on our the-
ory of optimal—rather than maximal—
SEA because such a correlation would 
imply a business case2 for ever-
increasing levels of SEA (for a similar 
discussion of corporate social responsi-
bility more generally, see McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001).   
 
Most research reviews in SEA still con-
clude that, because of variable findings, 
the correlation between social disclo-
sures and financial performance cannot 
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be established empirically (Deegan, 
2002; Ullmann, 1985).  However, two 
award-winning meta-analyses concluded 
there is a small positive yet negligible 
correlation (Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003).2  The 
meta-analytic results shown in Table 1 
suggest that we can, in fact, reach gen-
eral conclusions about the business case 
for SEA.  In general, the true score cor-
relation ρ between social disclosures and 
all different measures of corporate finan-
cial performance (CFP) is .09, with over 
98% of the cross-study variance by such 
artifacts as sampling error and measure-
ment error.  Whenever the cross-study 
variance explained reaches 75% in a 
meta-analysis (see sixth column in Table 
1), we can conclude that there are no 
moderators and we have correctly identi-
fied the population parameter, or mean 
true score correlation ρ (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2004).  With market measures 
of CFP (such as share price apprecia-
tion), the true-score correlation was 
slightly larger (ρ = .11; σ2ρ = .01).  
Thus, the meta-analytic data suggest that 
financial markets reward social disclo-
sures only to a minor extent.  However, 
the meta-analytic data also show that 
social disclosures are not correlated, and 
may even be inversely correlated, with 
any internal, accounting measures of 
CFP (ρ = -.02; σ2ρ = .00; i.e., all of the 
cross-study variance is explained by 
study artifacts).   
 
Hence, far from being inconclusive, the 
overall results show that voluntary dis-
closures have only small positive bene-
fits for the valuation of firms in financial 
markets and may even be counter-
productive in terms of internal account-
ing measures of CFP.  Since these ac-
counting measures can be conceptual-
ized as measures of organization-level 
efficiency in the use of company re-
sources, this finding reaffirms the afore-
mentioned idea that increasing levels of 
SEA are not necessarily efficient from 
an organizational perspective.  Alterna-
tively, the negative correlation between 
accounting CFP and SEA might lead to 
the conclusion that poor financial per-
formers are more likely to disclose so-
cial and environmental data (possibly to 
distract the readers of their annual re-
ports, such as shareholders, from their 
poor financial performance as measured 
by return on assets or equity).  This al-
ternative interpretation, though, calls 
into question the interpretability of SEA 
as a valid signal of organizational social 
and financial sustainability (see also pre-
vious section on “faking”).   
 
The only area in which empirical results 
are inconclusive is the correlation be-
tween SEA and firm risk (Orlitzky & 
Benjamin, 2001). The true score correla-
tion ρ of -.10 might suggest that SEA 
minimizes firm risk.  However, this con-
clusion would be premature because 
study artifacts explained only 26% of the 
cross-study variance, and thus the true 
score standard deviation SDρ was a size-
able .23 (the square root of the true score 
variance estimate reported in Table 1, 
i.e., ).  Furthermore, the file 
drawer analysis, which calculates the 
number of studies needed to change our 
conclusions substantially (i.e., a failsafe 
N), indicates that only one additional 
study would be needed to change con-
clusions in the case of SEA and firm 
risk.  Therefore, more studies will have 
to be conducted on SEA and firm risk 
before we can reach any general conclu-
2
ρσ
2  By “business case of SEA,” we mean SEA results in 
short- or long-term financial benefits for business.   
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sions in this area.   
Furthermore, these meta-analyses 
showed that, of all the different proxies 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
SEA was correlated with CFP to the 
smallest extent (Orlitzky & Swanson, in 
press)3.  These other CSR measures in-
cluded CSR reputation, executive val-
ues, and such organizational processes 
as social audits, philanthropic donations, 
issues management, stakeholder man-
agement, and environmental assessment, 
forecasting, and management.  For ex-
ample, when SEA is verified in the form 
of social audits, we observe a much 
greater and generalizable true score cor-
relation of .22 with CFP (see last row of 
Table 1).  This suggests that stake-
holders do not trust SEA as a signal of 
good corporate citizenship unless social 
disclosures are implemented in a com-
prehensive organizational audit system 
and objectively verified by independent 
auditors.  Overall, our previous, theory-
based intuition about the necessity of 
verification and auditing is supported by 
these meta-analytic findings.   
 
 
SEA and political governance systems 
 
Organizations’ social, political, and eco-
nomic environments may also affect the 
effectiveness of SEA.  Hitherto, this fact 
of organizational embeddedness has 
Relationship of 
Social Disclosures 
  
with… 
ka Total 
sample 
size 
Sample-size 
weighted 
mean ob-
served 
r (robs) 
Ob-
served 
variance 
% Vari-
ance 
Explainedb 
Mean 
true- 
score r 
(meanρ ) 
Vari-
ance of 
r 
[=σ2(ρ)] 
File 
Drawer 
Analysisc 
  
All measures of CFP 97 5,360 .0438 .0189 98.47% .0871 .0011 NA 
  
2.a.1. Market-based CFP 79 4,426 .0548 .0206 89.75% .1090 .0081 8 
  
2.a.2.  Accounting CFP 18 934 -.0085 .0077 100.00% -.0168 .0000 NA 
  
Business risk 2 213 -.0741 .0381 25.85% -.1041 .0543 1 
  
Social audits and CFP 35 5,016 .1143 .0081 100.00% .2272 .0000 45 
  
  
  
Table 1 
Meta-analytic Conclusions Regarding SEA 
Note: CFP = corporate financial performance. 
a
 k: number of correlation coefficients meta-analyzed;   
b
 refers to percentage of observed variance explained by sampling error and measurement error 
in CSP;   
c
 Hunter & Schmidt’s (1990) effect size file drawer analysis: Number of missing studies needed 
to bring robs up to -.05. 
 
Source: Orlitzky & Benjamin (2001); Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes (2003).  
3
 Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) won the 2001 Best 
Article Award given by the International Association 
for Business and Society (IABS) in association with 
California Management Review.  Orlitzky, Schmidt, and 
Rynes (2003) won the 2004 Moskowitz award for out-
standing quantitative research relevant to the social 
investment field.  The Moskowitz Prize is awarded 
annually to the research paper that best meets the fol-
lowing criteria: 1) practical significance to practitioners 
of socially responsible investing; 2) appropriateness and 
rigor of quantitative methods; and 3) novelty of re-
sults.  This entire research program will be summarized 
(and updated with new findings) in a forthcoming book 
(Orlitzky & Swanson, 2008).  
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been understated within the SEA litera-
ture. This is unfortunate, for without 
work explicitly concerned to connect 
SEA with the broader domain of politi-
cal governance systems, SEA scholar-
ship remains incomplete (Deegan, 2002; 
Mathews, 1997), especially given our 
focus on SEA effectiveness. Amongst 
other things then, and as will be further 
emphasized in the concluding discus-
sion, the present paper is concerned to 
suggest that scholars of SEA need to 
increasingly engage with, or at least 
more fully acknowledge, the ways in 
which the interrelated concerns of moral 
and political philosophy shape the politi-
cal governance systems that impact 
upon, or contribute to the definition of, 
the effectiveness of SEA. More specifi-
cally, the present section of the paper 
refers to a number of perspectives that 
combine to inform, and often compete to 
inform, the (re)design and (re)
construction of political governance sys-
tems within contemporary societies. 
With reference to the discussions al-
ready completed, what the present sec-
tion of the paper suggests is that, ulti-
mately, it is very difficult to conceive 
the effectiveness of SEA at the manage-
rial and/or stakeholder level minus the 
sort of bird’s eye view that the interre-
lated domains of moral and political phi-
losophy enable one to take.  It is for this 
reason that the following two systems of 
political governance are discussed next.  
 
 
The laissez-faire, classically liberal, 
and/or libertarian perspective 
 
The first political governance system 
can be termed the laissez-faire, classi-
cally liberal, and/or libertarian perspec-
tive. In this system, the importance of 
individual autonomy and freedom, espe-
cially negative liberty, is emphasized.  In 
effect, the idea of negative liberty refers 
to those liberties associated with respect-
ing private property, not being infringed 
upon, not being lied to, not being ag-
gressed against, and/or, not being forci-
bly constrained (e.g., Berlin, 1969; Sen, 
1988). For negative liberty to be re-
spected then, it is generally required that 
other people refrain from actively harm-
ing others or from forcibly imposing 
their will on others in any way. Never-
theless, and as Shue (1996: Chapter 2) 
has argued, if the negative liberties of a 
certain person (e.g., Person A) are to be 
respected, other people or institutions 
(e.g., Police Force Z) will commonly be 
required to act so as to forcefully pre-
vent another person (e.g., Person B) 
from infringing as such. Given this gen-
eral concern – and whilst acknowledging 
that some thinkers aligned with the lais-
sez-faire, classically liberal, or libertar-
ian perspective argue that not even a 
minimal state can be justified given that 
taxation is money paid under threat of 
institutionalized violence, and hence, 
disrespectful of negative liberty (e.g., 
Hoppe, 1999; Rothbard, 1978)  – most 
of those aligned with this broad line of 
thought side with Nozick (1974: ix) in 
thinking that something tending towards 
a “night-watchman” state limited “to the 
narrow functions of protection against 
force, theft, fraud, enforcement of con-
tracts and so on”  is justified. 
 
The second thing that the laissez-faire, 
classically liberal, or libertarian perspec-
tive tends to suggest is that the sum of 
individual goods within a given society 
is likely to be maximized so long as 
negative liberty is respected. This utili-
tarian argument, whilst not always put 
forward by those associated with a lais-
sez-faire, classically liberal, or libertar-
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ian perspective, is nevertheless com-
monly advanced. Mises (2002: 22-23), 
for example, makes the basic point well 
when he writes: 
…a system based on freedom 
for all workers warrants the 
greatest productivity of human 
labor and is therefore in the in-
terest of all the inhabitants of the 
earth… free labor… is able to 
create more wealth for every-
one…. 
Given these two beliefs – i.e., the belief 
in the importance of negative liberty and 
the belief that respect for negative lib-
erty maximizes social welfare – those 
who can be associated with a laissez-
faire perspective (e.g., Friedman, 1962; 
1970; Mises, 1963; Mises, 1990; 
Nozick, 1974; Smith, 1776/1976) tend to 
(1) want the role of the nation-state to be 
limited to something approaching the 
“night-watchman” role4 and (2) tend to 
champion the benefits that a society de-
rives from the actions that business peo-
ple (who are largely understood as being 
motivated by the desire to maximize 
their own financial profits) engage in to 
try to satisfy consumers.  
 
Before proceeding to expand on the sec-
ond of these two points, which is closely 
related to Smith’s idea of the invisible 
hand (see below), it should be high-
lighted that the laissez-faire, classically 
liberal, or libertarian ideal of society has 
never been actualized on any large scale 
in recent history (it may, however, have 
been actualized on a large scale histori-
cally or on a smaller scale more re-
cently). Indeed, not even nineteenth-
century Britain, which is commonly con-
sidered the archetype of a classically 
liberal society, limited the role of the 
nation-state to that of the “night-
watchman” (Taylor, 1972). Neverthe-
less, this general perspective has had a 
massive influence on the collective psy-
che of Western society and has thus in-
fluenced the design and construction of 
its political governance systems. Ac-
cordingly, it is here argued that a sophis-
ticated understanding of the laissez-
faire, classically liberal, or libertarian 
perspective is of vital importance to any 
discussion of the effectiveness of SEA. 
Three specific reasons will now be put 
forward for arguing thus.  
 
First, an understanding of laissez-faire 
thinking is vital if one wishes to contex-
tualize the fact that the managers of lim-
ited-liability and publicly traded corpo-
rations are legally obliged, and remu-
neratively encouraged, to try to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth (e.g., Beer-
worth, 2004/2005; Bostock, 2004/2005; 
Collison, 2003; Cragg, 2002; Owen, 
2005a). This fact, which means that 
managers are strongly encouraged to 
measure the effectiveness of SEA in 
terms of maximum net company bene-
fits, is often presented in a negative light 
within the SEA scholarly literature given 
that it tends to limit the extent and qual-
ity of SEA activities (Owen, 2005b). In 
short, those who present the “profit mo-
tive” in a negative light, do so for ethical 
reasons. Accordingly, and as the preced-
ing discussion suggests, it is important 
that scholars of SEA recognize that this 
concern with profit maximization can be 
argued for on both deontological (and/or 
rights-based) and utilitarian grounds 
(McCloskey, 2006; Mises, 1963; Smith, 
1776/1976).  
 
4
 Neither Friedman nor Smith, for instance, champi-
oned the sort of “pure” laissez-faire perspective being 
here discussed. Nevertheless, both thinkers have defi-
nitely championed the benefits of limiting government 
involvement in various social and economic issues. 
Hence the emphasis placed on the word approaching. 
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The deontological (and/or rights-based) 
argument in favor of profit maximiza-
tion states that as long as profits are gen-
erated in a manner that does not infringe 
on the negative liberty of other people – 
e.g., so long as there is no coercion or 
deception involved – then they are justi-
fied. This argument is directly related to 
the idea that a truly commercial interac-
tion is mutually beneficial, and hence, 
non-coercive. Furthermore, this idea is 
related to the belief that, so long as one 
is entitled to, or rightly owns, the re-
sources utilized in the production of 
goods and services, then they are also 
entitled to, or deserving of, any profits 
that the sale of these goods and services 
generate (Kirzner, 1989; Nozick, 1974).    
In contrast to the deontological (and/or 
rights-based) argument, the utilitarian 
argument justifies the right of individu-
als to earn private profits on the basis 
that this right has positive consequences 
for social welfare. Mises neatly encapsu-
lated one element of the utilitarian de-
fense of private profits by stating that:  
The behavior of the consumers 
makes profits and losses appear 
and thereby shifts ownership of 
the means of production from 
the hands of the less efficient 
into those of the more efficient 
[…] In the absence of profit and 
loss the entrepreneurs would not 
know what the most urgent 
needs of the consumers are. 
(Mises, 1963: 299)  
 
And, more famously, Adam Smith has 
provided a utilitarian argument defend-
ing private profits when he wrote: 
The uniform, constant, and unin-
terrupted effort of every man to 
better his condition, the princi-
ple from which public and na-
tional, as well as private opu-
lence is originally derived, is 
frequently powerful enough to 
maintain the natural progress of 
things towards improvement, in 
spite both of the extravagance of 
government, and of the greatest 
errors of administration. Like 
the unknown principle of animal 
life, it frequently restores health 
and vigour to the constitution, in 
spite, not only of the disease, but 
of the absurd prescriptions of 
the doctor.  (Smith, 1776/1976: 
443)  
 
Both the deontological and utilitarian 
arguments made above help justify insti-
tutional frameworks that strongly en-
courage managers to judge the effective-
ness of SEA initiatives in terms of firm-
specific net returns from SEA.  Accord-
ingly, it can be argued that those who 
wish managers to primarily judge the 
effectiveness of SEA initiatives in other 
ways – such as in terms of accountabil-
ity to stakeholders (Owen, 2005b) – 
need to directly engage these normative 
arguments if they are to alter systems of 
political, economic, and corporate gov-
ernance that encourage managers to be 
primarily concerned with profit maximi-
zation. 
 
The second point to be made, in relation 
to SEA and the laissez-faire, classically 
liberal, and/or libertarian perspective, is 
that the deontological argument aligned 
with this worldview can be used to argue 
for the necessity of honest and compre-
hensive disclosure when it comes to 
SEA. Indeed, given the laissez-faire con-
cern with truly commercial interactions 
and, given the presupposition that many 
consumers are concerned with the social 
and environmental impact that compa-
nies can have, it can be argued that com-
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panies are morally obliged – on laissez-
faire, classically liberal, or libertarian 
grounds – to honestly and comprehen-
sively disclose the impact that the pro-
duction and sale of company goods and 
services have in regard to social and en-
vironmental matters. The reason why 
this can be argued is that the mutual 
benefit upon which any commercial 
transaction is based implies the need to 
disclose information that could poten-
tially prevent a sale. For example, at 
least some people would, all other things 
being equal, prefer to purchase products 
from companies determined to reduce 
their carbon footprint than those not so 
concerned. Thus, if a company decided 
to give the false impression that their 
carbon footprint was less than that of 
their competitors via their SEA, then 
they could be ethically criticized on lais-
sez-faire, classically liberal, or libertar-
ian grounds: for lying (whether actively 
or by omission) is to disrespect the nega-
tive liberty and personal autonomy of 
others. Furthermore, the failure of or-
ganizations to provide honest accounts 
of such issues will likely increase trans-
action costs incurred by customers and 
other stakeholders in the future because 
deception lowers trust, which in turn 
necessitates more future monitoring. 
Obviously, such an outcome will also 
lead to undesirable outcomes at the level 
of aggregate social welfare.    
 
The third reason that an understanding 
of the laissez-faire perspective is vital to 
understanding the current state of, and 
current debates surrounding, SEA, is due 
to the utilitarian argument associated 
with the classically liberal perspective 
suggesting that it would be a mistake for 
governments to over-regulate this area. 
This general argument, most closely as-
sociated with various thinkers aligned 
with the Austrian school of economics 
(Kirzner, 1985; 1989; Mises, 1963; 
1990), suggests, amongst other things, 
that if governments set and enforce base-
line standards that must be met with re-
gard to SEA reporting, then companies 
will be likely to do no more than try to 
achieve this baseline standard. One rea-
son why this might occur is that, when-
ever governments set a baseline stan-
dard, they can, whether intentionally or 
not, give off the impression that any ef-
fort to improve upon this level would 
result in resources being misallocated. 
Furthermore, whenever governments 
provide hard and fast rules for the com-
pletion of a task, managers and business 
people will obviously decide not to try 
to create a better way to accomplish the 
same task on the grounds that govern-
ment regulations will not allow such an 
improvement to be implemented. In 
short, it can be said that government 
regulation, in these and other matters, 
discourages innovation and results in a 
suboptimal compliance rather than a 
more desirable integrity mindset on the 
part of business executives (Paine, 
1994). Furthermore, whenever such 
baseline standards are implemented, 
firms will be in a position to deflect 
criticism that they might receive from 
various stakeholders for not doing more 
by responding: “Company X has 
achieved the government’s standards 
and hence Company X has met society’s 
expectations.”  Such a managerial com-
pliance mindset can translate into a 
stance of “as bad as the law allows” (to 
borrow the words of Interface CEO Ray 
Anderson).    
 
In building off this same argument, it 
can also be suggested that, whenever 
governments regulate and monopolize 
reporting and accounting processes, they 
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decrease the sphere available to social 
and environmental entrepreneurship and 
innovation. What this suggests, in spe-
cific regard to the contemporary lack of 
governmentally enforced SEA activities, 
is that such a lack is far from being a bad 
thing. To briefly elaborate, this lack of 
governmental presence leaves a vacuum 
that market-driven innovations from sev-
eral competitors can fill. Thus, we have 
organizations, such as AccountAbility in 
the UK, the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), KPI in Europe, and other simi-
larly oriented organizations, all develop-
ing systems and institutions that encour-
age SEA innovations. Such diversity and 
competition, according to the laissez-
faire perspective, is beneficial. And, 
when it comes to a young and develop-
ing field like SEA, it might be suggested 
that this lack of hard regulation is a very 
good thing indeed.   
 
 
The liberal democratic perspective 
 
The second political governance system 
can be termed the liberal democratic 
perspective. It is arguably more impor-
tant than the laissez-faire, the classically 
liberal, or libertarian perspective in that 
it is actualized to a greater extent within 
the world today. The reason then for the 
laissez-faire perspective having been 
discussed first is that, in a number of 
important regards, the liberal democratic 
perspective can be considered a moder-
ated version of it. With this stated, the 
first thing to note is that, whilst being far 
from disrespectful of negative liberty, 
the liberal democratic perspective never-
theless suggests that people have a right 
to other goods as well; and, that liberal 
democratic nation-states have a duty to 
provide these goods to its citizens. These 
goods, which are commonly thought to 
include things such as basic levels of 
education and welfare, can be consid-
ered examples of positive liberty (Sen, 
1988) in that such goods positively en-
able people to achieve certain ends that 
mere negative liberty cannot ensure (e.g. 
without a basic level of education, indi-
viduals are unlikely to be capable of 
holding down a decent job, even though 
their negative liberty is respected and 
protected).  
 
In addition to such positive liberties, 
which are commonly argued for on de-
ontological grounds and/or on the basis 
of human rights (e.g., Donnelly, 2003: 
Chapters 1-3), supporters of the liberal 
democratic perspective consider equal 
political participation essential to living 
a good and full human life. Indeed, and 
once again, those of a liberal democratic 
bent regard participation in the democ-
ratic election of politicians as a human 
right (e.g., Gewirth, 1996: Chapter 8). 
On this particular point, it must be men-
tioned that advocates of a laissez-faire, 
classically liberal, or libertarian political 
governance system also commonly 
champion the importance of political 
participation. The difference between 
the two perspectives in this specific re-
gard is that, whilst advocates of laissez-
faire political governance systems try to 
convince the voting public that it is im-
portant to keep the role of governments 
to a minimum, advocates of liberal de-
mocracy argue that democratic govern-
ments need to play a much more active 
role. 
 
Those aligned with the liberal democ-
ratic perspective will argue as such be-
cause they believe it important that all 
the people within a given society have 
their positive and participative rights 
respected and, in contrast to advocates 
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of laissez-faire, that governments need 
to play a more than minimal role to en-
sure that the “social good” is maxi-
mized. In regard to the “social good”, 
which is here conceived in utilitarian 
terms, those aligned with the liberal de-
mocratic perspective commonly put for-
ward  two  reasons as to why simply re-
specting negative liberty will not ensure 
an increase in social welfare (see Bau-
mol, 1965, for example). First, they 
commonly reason that, without govern-
ment direction and/or control of re-
sources, certain public goods will often 
go unproduced on the grounds that pri-
vate providers are unable to capture any 
income from their production. Second, 
they commonly reason that, minus gov-
ernment regulation of commerce and 
industry, negative externalities will pro-
liferate given the costs associated with 
self-regulation. Whenever either of these 
things occurs – i.e., whenever markets 
do not produce certain public goods or 
whenever they produce negative exter-
nalities – the market can be said to have 
failed.  
 
As the preceding discussions state, those 
aligned with the liberal democratic per-
spective believe – in contrast to those 
aligned with the laissez-faire, classically 
liberal, or libertarian perspective – that a 
more than minimal government directing 
society in the name of the people, and 
indeed, for the people, is justified. More 
specifically, those aligned with the lib-
eral democratic perspective commonly 
want governments to impose hard regu-
lations that require business people and 
managers to act one way or the other. To 
reiterate, the basic reason why is that 
those aligned with the liberal democratic 
perspective do not believe that social 
welfare will be maximized if business 
people and managers are left to pursue 
profits in a regulatory environment that 
is simply and solely concerned to protect 
negative liberty. Thus, and whilst the 
liberal democratic perspective is far 
from disparaging of the utilitarian argu-
ments that those aligned with the laissez-
faire perspective make, it nevertheless 
suggests that governments need to estab-
lish various rules, regulations, incen-
tives, and so on to ensure that the ener-
gies of profit-motivated actors contribute 
to, and do not undermine, the “social 
good.”  
 
One of the key decisions facing public 
policy makers then, according to the lib-
eral democratic perspective, is whether 
or not they should “devise mechanisms,” 
or “allow mechanisms to evolve, that 
channel the pursuit of profits in a so-
cially productive direction” (McMillan, 
2002: 228). In specific regard to SEA, 
what this means is that public policy 
must decide whether governments 
should, or should not, impose hard regu-
lation on business and corporate activi-
ties. As the preceding sub-section has 
indicated, there are potential costs asso-
ciated with hard regulation, i.e., dimin-
ished innovation and the potential for a 
reduction in activities towards the lowest 
common denominator. However, and as 
the discussion of this sub-section has 
indicated, there are similarly potential 
negatives associated with leaving such 
institutional creation to the invisible 
hand.  
 
One potential negative is that, without 
government coercion, various other 
stakeholders will be unable to enforce 
honest and comprehensive reporting and 
social disclosures. Thus, if a society con-
siders it important that people have ac-
cess to information established via SEA 
activities, it can be argued that govern-
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ments need to ensure, via ultimately co-
ercive means, that businesses and corpo-
rations disclose such information. Im-
portantly, this specific concern is related 
to the more general notion that, “a 
workable market design keeps in check 
transaction costs… These costs include 
the time, effort, and money spent in the 
process of doing business – both those 
incurred by the buyer in addition to the 
actual price paid…Transaction costs can 
arise before any business is 
done” (McMillan, 2002: 9).    
 
This idea of transaction costs is central 
to understanding the fact that various 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
– such as the CORE coalition, for exam-
ple (Zerk, 2007)  – continue to lobby 
liberal democratic governments for in-
creasingly stringent and comprehensive 
SEA practices. One of the reasons they 
desire such regulation is so that they can 
then use this information to suggest to 
their own members, and to the public 
more generally, that if they hold certain 
values regarding any number of social 
and/or environmental concerns, then 
they should choose Company A over 
Company B, C, and D. In short, they 
wish the government to impose increas-
ingly comprehensive regulations so that 
they can reduce the transaction cost for 
those who wish to make purchasing de-
cisions on more than narrowly instru-
mental grounds.5 
 
A second reason why various NGOs 
wish to see increasingly stringent and 
comprehensive SEA practices enforced 
by governments is so that they can use 
this information to suggest the need for 
other policy initiatives. For example, if 
environmental NGOs have increased 
access to information regarding defores-
tation, desalination, groundwater usage, 
hazardous chemical usage, and so on, 
then they can use this information to try 
to encourage governments to engage in 
new policy initiatives whose aim is to 
ensure that corporate practices improve 
in such regards. Clearly, if one accepts 
that corporations can both positively and 
negatively impact upon social and envi-
ronmental concerns, and if one similarly 
accepts – as do those aligned with the 
liberal democratic perspective – that 
government action is commonly re-
quired to ensure that corporations posi-
tively impact upon social and environ-
mental concerns, then it is clear as to 
why governmentally enforced SEA stan-
dards may be required. Indeed, it can be 
argued that governments themselves will 
be unable to establish the relative suc-
cess or failure of various policy initia-
tives unless they have access to informa-
tion garnered from SEA practices. In 
short, the liberal democratic perspective 
suggests that governments will com-
monly be required to regulate various 
elements of SEA if the activities of 
profit-motivated actors are to contribute 
to, and not undermine, social welfare. 
    
In liberal democratic governance sys-
tems, then, the emphasis shifts from firm
-level effectiveness of SEA (MBSEA(firm) 
= MCSEA(firm)) to social efficiency 
(MBSEA(all) = MCSEA(all)).  This shift in 
emphasis is shown as an arrow in Figure 
1. As argued before, the arrow does not 
imply that laissez-faire capitalism cannot 
maximize social efficiency.  Rather, in 
the absence of government intervention 
(in laissez-faire systems), managers have 
5
 Of course, costs are not reduced at the aggregate level 
because more regulation means a larger governmental 
bureaucracy is needed to enforce these regulations, 
which in turn needs to be funded with greater taxation.  
Strictly speaking, we are not dealing with a society-
level reduction in (transaction) costs but with a transfer 
of costs from one set of stakeholders to another. 
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cognitive leeway to focus on employer 
interest in their cost-benefit analyses of 
any given corporate action. Arguments 
can be provided that these ultimately self
-interested actions result in the greatest 
public benefit, or maximum social effi-
ciency (Bragues, 2006; Mises, 1963; 
Smith, 1776/1976).  So, “shift in empha-
sis” refers to a shift in managerial think-
ing, which is forced (either directly or 
indirectly) through government interven-
tion in liberal democratic societies, to 
transcend, in all managerial decision 
making, the organization-level calculus 
of MBSEA(firm) = MCSEA(firm) and consider 
the broader stakeholder benefits of or-
ganizational practices and policies.  
 
 
Suggestions for future research 
 
This paper, like a great deal of the exist-
ing scholarly literature on SEA, concen-
trates on Western countries and Western 
institutional forms. Accordingly, we 
suggest that future research on SEA 
needs to broaden its horizons, and in-
creasingly engage with hitherto under-
represented geographic regions, and the 
varying institutional frameworks that 
prevail within them. For example, 
Aguilera & Jackson (2003: 453), Stern-
berg (1998), and Yafeh (2000) have all 
highlighted that corporate governance 
systems within East-Asia are commonly 
characterized by a system of cross-
shareholdings. Furthermore, Hansmann 
& Kraakman (2004: 40), Robins (2002), 
and Whelan (2007) have all emphasized 
that the political governance systems of 
East-Asia have historically tended to 
emphasize a stronger role for govern-
ments in the direction of industrial pol-
icy. Arguably, the moral and political 
philosophies that support such different 
political governance systems need to be 
articulated, if one is to fully understand 
the current state of SEA within these 
different countries. Whelan’s (2007) 
work in particular, which engages with 
Confucian thought to make further sense 
of the Asian financial crisis and just 
what corporate social responsibility 
might mean in this part of the world, 
provides an example of how moral and 
political philosophies can be used to 
shine a light on matters of institutional 
concern.    
 
Another area that requires further re-
search is empirical work relating to the 
moral frameworks through which man-
agers view the world. Tetlock (2000), 
for example, has highlighted that the 
way in which managers view a particular 
situation will be informed by the ethical 
and political theories they align them-
selves with. To briefly extrapolate, such 
work suggests – along with Whelan’s 
(2002) work on Pierre Bourdieu’s failure 
to change the institutionalized patterns 
of the French media – that if managers 
are to be convinced of the merits of 
adopting various SEA activities, then it 
would be sensible for those trying to 
convince managers to present their argu-
ments in a manner that is not inconsis-
tent with the ethical and political beliefs 
that managers have. Thus, if one presup-
poses that the managers of business cor-
porations are largely in favor of com-
mercial enterprise, arguments aimed at 
convincing managers to adopt various 
SEA practices should not, in addition to 
other things, rankly criticize commerce. 
Or, if one presupposes that managers 
and students of business tend to be utili-
tarian in ethical orientation, as has been 
suggested in at least some of the litera-
ture (Orlitzky, 1997), then those wishing 
to convince managers of the merits of 
SEA, should do so in utilitarian terms. 
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Rather obviously, just what the ethical 
and political beliefs of managers are, 
and the way in which these beliefs im-
pact on managerial perceptions of SEA, 
is a question that requires further empiri-
cal research.   
 
The field of SEA, like most of the aca-
demic business literature (Pfeffer, 1993; 
Van Maanen, 1995b), is characterized 
by high paradigmatic diversity 
(Mathews, 1997; Owen & O'Dwyer, 
2008).  Paradigmatic diversity implies 
that different perspectives and findings 
are incommensurate (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979).  To clarify the current state of 
affairs, researchers could, at a minimum, 
investigate why paradigmatic diversity is 
so prevalent in the SEA research arena 
(see also McKinley, Mone & Moon, 
1999). Pfeffer (1993) and others (e.g., 
Wilson, 1998) argued that science would 
progress most rapidly when researchers 
agree on a common set of ontological 
and epistemological assumptions.  On 
these grounds, it might be worthwhile to 
strive towards greater theoretical agree-
ment.  From the vantage point of scien-
tific progress and influence, the best 
type of SEA theory would not only be 
unified but also prescriptive (Bazerman, 
2005).  On the other hand, it must be 
acknowledged that, given the relative 
youth of the field, a diversity of ap-
proaches would arguably allow for 
maximum innovation (Van Maanen, 
1995a; b).   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we took a few preliminary 
steps toward the development of a pre-
scriptive theory of the effectiveness of 
SEA at two levels of analysis 
(organizational and societal).  We con-
cluded that, given the impact of signal-
ing and transaction costs and various 
benefits of SEA, the level of SEA should 
be set so that marginal costs of SEA 
equal marginal benefits (at the firm 
level) or marginal costs of SEA to soci-
ety equal marginal benefits to society (in 
line with the tenets of social effi-
ciency).   However, because all organ-
izational decision making is embedded 
in moral and political governance sys-
tems, we also highlighted the importance 
of these systems for SEA.  In doing so, 
and amongst other points made, we drew 
on laissez-faire or classically liberal 
thinking to argue that honest and com-
prehensive disclosure is needed if the 
relationship between consumers and cor-
porations is to be a truly commercial 
one, and, in drawing on liberal democ-
ratic ideas, we suggested that govern-
ments will commonly try to impose stan-
dards for disclosure on corporations 
whenever suitable levels of disclosure 
do not voluntarily arise.  In doing so, 
these “macro” discussions provide an 
overview of certain normative beliefs 
which can be understood to justify the 
roles governments currently do (or do 
not) play in setting standards for SEA; 
and, a further understanding of why An-
glo-American corporations are posi-
tively encouraged to try to maximize 
profits. The paper concluded with three 
suggestions for future research.   
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